UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-30-2019

Bower v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 46088

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"Bower v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 46088" (2019). Not Reported. 5576.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/5576

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
5/30/2019 4:56 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

KYLE STEVEN BOWER,
Petitioner-Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO. 46088-2018
CANYON COUNTY NO. CV2016-5277

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT KYLE STEVEN BOWER
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON
________________________
HONORABLE GENE A. PETTY
District Judge
________________________

ROBYN FYFFE, ISB#7063
Fyffe Law
800 W. Main St., Ste. 1460
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 338-5231
robyn@fyffelaw.com
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONERAPPELLANT KYLE STEVEN BOWER

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Idaho Attorney General
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720
(208) 334-4534
ecf@ag.idaho.gov
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Table of Authorities ............................................................................................................ii

II.

Argument in Reply ..............................................................................................................1
A.

Mr. Bower Did Not Forfeit His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims Under
I.C.§19-4901(b) and He Established that Prosecutorial Misconduct Violated his ...
Constitutional Rights. ..............................................................................................1
1.

“Could have been raised on direct appeal” pursuant to I.C. §
19-4901(b) means more than the technical possibility of raising
an issue on direct appeal without a sufficient factual record……………3

2.

Constitutional claims requiring factual development beyond the
appellate record are not claims that “could have been raised on
direct appeal” pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b)……………………………..4

3.

I.C. § 19-4901(b) provides a remedy for constitutional claims requiring
factual development in addition to Sixth Amendment claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel……………………………………….….6

4.

The substantial showing of unreliability and due diligence is
inapplicable unless the issue could have been raised on appeal…………9

5.

I.C. § 19-4901’s plainly provides a remedy for prejudicial
fundamental errors that deprive a defendant of his right to a
fair trial even where that error did not occur as a result of
ineffective assistance of counsel…………………………………………10

B. Mr. Bower Established that he Received Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Violation of the Sixth Amendment by a Preponderance
of the Evidence…………………………………………………………………………12
III.

Conclusion

...................................................................................................................13

i

I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
State Cases
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988)……………………………………passim
Grove v. State, 161 Idaho 840, 392 P.3d 18 (Ct. App. 2017) …………………………………1-2
Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 603 P.2d 1005 (1979)……………………………………………
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292,92 P.3d 542 (Ct. App. 2004)…………………………….…passim
State v. Brown, 130 Idaho 865, 949 P.2d 1072 (Ct. App. 1997)………………………………4, 8
State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct.App.1985)…………………………………11
State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427, 34 P.3d 1110 (Ct. App. 2001)……………………………………4, 8
State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 429 P.3d 149 (2018), reh’g denied (Nov. 13, 2018)……………5
State v. Kellis, 129 Idaho 730, 932 P.2d 358 (Ct. App. 1997)……………………………………8
State v. Koch, 116 Idaho 571, 777 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1989)…………………………………4, 6
State v. Miller, No. 46517, 2019 WL 1217673, at *2 (Idaho Mar. 15, 2019)……………………5
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010)………………………………………passim
State v. Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 911 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1995)…………………………………4
State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 989 P.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1999)…………………………………10
State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 285 P.3d 348 (Ct. App. 2012)…………………………………9
Tapp v. State, No. 43347 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2017)……………..………………12
Tapp v. State, No. 40197 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2013)………………………………12
Thumm v. State, No. 45290, 2019 WL 848061, at *14 (Idaho Feb. 22, 2019)……………passim
Federal Cases
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)…………………………………………….……2
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975)………………………………………….…11

ii

II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

Mr. Bower Did Not Forfeit His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims
Under I.C. § 19-4901(b) and He Established that Prosecutorial
Misconduct Violated his Constitutional Rights
As argued in Mr. Bower’s opening brief, he established that prosecutorial

misconduct violated his due process rights by a preponderance of the evidence. In
response, the state argues the district court correctly found that Mr. Bower forfeited
his due process claims under I.C. § 19-4901(b) because they could have been raised
on direct appeal under the fundamental error doctrine under State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). The state — and the Court of Appeals in
Grove v. State, 161 Idaho 840, 392 P.3d 18 (Ct. App. 2017) — assert that all
constitutional claims (except Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel
claims) can only be raised in post-conviction relief when the petitioner makes “a
substantial factual showing . . . that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial
doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due
diligence, have been presented earlier.” I.C. § 19-4901(b); see also Thumm v. State,
No. 45290, 2019 WL 848061, at *14 (Idaho Feb. 22, 2019)(pet for re’hrg pending).
Otherwise, according to the state and Grove, a petitioner can only secure relief for a
prejudicial constitutional violation to which his trial counsel failed to object, if that
failure to object also meets the highly deferential standard necessary to establish
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ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).
However, constitutional claims that require factual development beyond the
appellate record, which are technically possible to raise (and lose) on direct appeal,
are not claims that “could have been raised on direct appeal” pursuant to I.C. §
19-4901(b). Rather, Section § 19-4901(b) permits a defendant to reserve claims
requiring factual development for post-conviction relief proceedings and renders
such a claim res judicata should a defendant elect to raise it on direct appeal. Kraft
v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 673, 603 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1979); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho
758, 766, 760 P.2d 1174, 1182 (1988). Moreover, § 19-4901(a)(1) plainly provides a
remedy when “the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution of
the United States or the constitution or laws of this state,” not just for Sixth
Amendment violations of the right to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Unlike the petitioners in Grove and Thumm, Mr. Bower did not raise claims
of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal as fundamental error. Because trial
counsel did not object to the misconduct, I.C. § 19-4901(b) permitted Mr. Bower to
properly reserve the issue for post-conviction relief, where he could develop a factual
record to support his claims. Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that
Mr. Bower’s prosecutorial misconduct claims were ones that could have been raised
on direct appeal and in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
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1.

“Could have been raised on direct appeal” pursuant to I.C. §
19-4901(b) means more than the technical possibility of raising
an issue on direct appeal without a sufficient factual record

Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) does not require a defendant to raise a constitutional
claim on direct appeal that requires factual development beyond the appellate
record only to receive an averse decision that will become res judicata. Instead,
precedent has construed I.C. § 19-4901(b)’s “could have been raised” as not applying
to claims that are more appropriately presented in post-conviction relief,
notwithstanding the technical possibility to raise them on direct appeal.
In Kraft, the Court construed a prior version of I.C. § 19-4901(b), which
provided that post-conviction relief neither substituted nor affected any remedy
incident to trial court proceedings or of an appeal from the conviction or sentence.
Kraft, 100 Idaho at 674, 603 P.2d at 1008. The Court held that counsel’s competence
becomes res judicata when raised on direct appeal but may be reserved “more
properly for a post-conviction hearing.” Kraft, 100 Idaho at 674, 603 P.2d at 1008.
In 1986, the legislature amended Section § 19-4901(b) to indicate an issue
may not be considered in post-conviction proceeding when it could have been raised
on direct appeal (and was not). Aragon, 114 Idaho at 766, 760 P.2d at 1182. This
amendment codified the pre-existing case law enunciated in Kraft “that in actions
between the same parties upon the same claim, the former adjudication (here,
direct appeal) concludes parties ‘but also as to every matter which might or should
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have been litigated in the first suit.’” Aragon, 114 Idaho at 766, 760 P.2d at 1182,
quoting Kraft, 100 Idaho at 673, 603 P.2d at 1007.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are “preferably” brought in postconviction relief but are “properly raised on direct appeal” when the defendant
claims it is clear from the record that trial counsel was ineffective. State v. Pugsley,
128 Idaho 168, 174, 911 P.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App. 1995); see also State v. Doe, 136
Idaho 427, 433–34, 34 P.3d 1110, 1116–17 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Brown, 130
Idaho 865, 870, 949 P.2d 1072, 1077 (Ct. App. 1997). Nonetheless, ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are not barred by I.C. § 19-4901(b) for failing to raise
them on direct appeal because they are “more appropriately” presented in postconviction where an evidentiary record can be developed. Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho
292, 295–96, 92 P.3d 542, 545–46 (Ct. App. 2004); see also State v. Koch, 116 Idaho
571, 573, 777 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Ct. App. 1989) (addressing ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal but repeating “the admonition that ineffective assistance of
counsel is not a subject ordinarily well suited to a direct appeal”).
The phrase “could have been raised” refers to claims that are cognizable and
appropriately raised on direct appeal. Consistent with Krafts and Aragon, a
defendant may raise an issue that generally requires factual development on direct
appeal arguing the error is clear or reserve the claim for post-conviction but may
not raise the issue in both proceedings.
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2.

Constitutional claims requiring factual development beyond
the appellate record are not claims that “could have been
raised on direct appeal” pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b)

Un-objected to fundamental error that is not “clear or obvious” under the
Perry fundamental error doctrine can technically be raised (and lost) on direct
appeal. However, such an error presents factual issues more appropriately
addressed via a petition for post-conviction relief.
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court “reemphasize[d] that in order to satisfy
[the second Perry prong] a defendant bears the burden of showing clear error in the
record,” meaning “must contain evidence of the error and the record must also
contain evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in
failing to object.” State v. Miller, No. 46517, 2019 WL 1217673, at *2 (Idaho Mar. 15,
2019). Where the record contains no “evidence regarding whether counsel’s decision
was strategic, the claim is factual in nature and thus more appropriately addressed
via a petition for post-conviction relief.” Id. at *2. Further, whereas a defendant
previously satisfied Perry’s third prong by “proving there is a reasonable possibility
that the error affected the outcome of the trial” [State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261,
429 P.3d 149, 155 (2018), reh’g denied (Nov. 13, 2018)], Miller “clarified” that the
appellate record must establish that the unpreserved error “actually affected the
outcome of the trial proceedings.” Miller, No. 46517, 2019 WL 1217673, at *2
(emphasis added).
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Unless the appellate record establishes that an un-objected to error is “clear
or obvious” and actually effected the outcome without needing any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, it is properly reserved for postconviction relief to develop a factual record. Mr. Bower properly reserved his
prosecutorial misconduct claims for post-conviction relief and did not waive those
issues by failing to raise them on direct appeal.
3.

I.C. § 19-4901(b) provides a remedy for constitutional claims
requiring factual development in addition to Sixth Amendment
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

“Not all issues. . . are barred by res judicata in post-conviction proceedings for
failure to argue them on direct appeal, including ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, which are a matter for post-conviction relief.” Aragon, 114 Idaho at 766 n.12,
760 P.2d at 1182 n.12. Although ineffective assistance of counsel claims clearly
could be raised on direct appeal, they are not barred by Section 19-4901(b) because
they are more appropriately raised in post-conviction relief. A defendant can choose
to raise the issue on direct appeal, resulting in an averse ruling that becomes res
judicata, or reserve the issue for the more appropriate forum. Kraft, 100 Idaho at
674, 603 P.2d at 1008; see also Koch, 116 Idaho at 573, 777 P.2d at 1246 (noting
post-conviction relief is the “better method” to present an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim but considering the issue since it was presented); Sparks v. State, 140
Idaho 292, 295–96, 92 P.3d 542, 545–46 (Ct. App. 2004) (district court erred in
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finding the petitioner waived ineffective assistance of counsel claims by failing to
raise them on direct appeal because the appellate record is rarely adequate to
review such claims and they are more appropriately presented in post-conviction
where an evidentiary record can be developed).
The state distinguishes ineffective assistance of counsel claims, arguing the
reason Section 19-4901(b) does not bar such claims is because their “very nature”
precludes their consideration during trial “while the defendant is still represented
by the allegedly ineffective trial counsel.” However, the state cites no authority
establishing it is the concept of waiver, rather than the absence of necessary record,
that places ineffective assistance of counsel outside the Section 19-4901(b) bar.
Instead, ineffective assistance of counsel is appropriately raised in postconviction relief because the record on direct appeal is rarely sufficient to support
the claims. See State v. Blackburn, 99 Idaho 222, 222–23, 579 P.2d 1205, 1205–06
(1978) (appellate record was devoid of facts to support defendant’s claims and
proper forum for raising allegations based on matters outside the record is post
conviction); Sparks, 140 Idaho at 295–96, 92 P.3d at 545–46 (ineffective assistance
of counsel claims should almost invariably be brought in post-conviction relief
where an evidentiary record can be developed); State v. Brazzell, 118 Idaho 431,
433, 797 P.2d 139, 141 (Ct. App. 1990) (ineffective assistance is rarely appropriate
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in direct appeal and is usually reserved “to post-conviction relief proceedings, where
a fuller record can be developed”).
“Post-conviction counsel must have the ability to develop a separate
evidentiary record on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, including the ability
to call witnesses and present evidence in a separate civil proceeding.” State v. Doe,
136 Idaho 427, 433–34, 34 P.3d 1110, 1116–17 (Ct. App. 2001). Our courts have
historically declined to consider ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal to
provide a defendant a meaningful opportunity to develop factual support for his
claims. State v. Brown, 130 Idaho 865, 870, 949 P.2d 1072, 1077 (Ct. App. 1997)
(this case does not present the rare situation where the adequacy of trial counsel's
performance can be determined by simply reviewing the available transcripts. only
secure relief for a due process violation if that violation occurred as a result of
ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Kellis, 129 Idaho 730, 733, 932 P.2d 358,
361 (Ct. App. 1997) (declining to review ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal to provide opportunity to present claim in post-conviction relief).
Ineffective assistance of counsel are not barred by I.C. § 19-4901(b) because
the claims generally require factual development beyond the appellate record.
Section 19-4901(b) similarly does not bar other constitutional claims requiring
factual development because they are not clear or obvious under Perry.
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4.

The substantial showing of unreliability and due diligence is
inapplicable unless the issue could have been raised on appeal

According to the state, I.C. § 19-4901(b) “unambiguously bars post-conviction
petitioners from raising direct constitutional claims unless those claims could not
have, in the exercise of due diligence, been raised earlier.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 22.
The state is incorrect. Under the statute’s plain language, petitioners are only
required to establish that an issue raises a substantial doubt about the conviction’s
reliability and diligently could not have been presented earlier when the issue
“could have been raised on direct appeal.” I.C. § 19-4901(b). Direct constitutional
claims that are not reviewable under Perry are not issues that could have been
raised on direct appeal and can be reserved for post-conviction relief. Because such
claims cannot be raised on direct appeal, the substantial showing requirement is
inapplicable.
The state cites to Thumm in which the Court held that I.C. § 19-4901(b)
barred the petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims even though he only could
have raised the claim on direct appeal under fundamental error standard.
However, unlike Mr. Bower, the Thumm petitioner raised some unobjected to
instances of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal, arguing they were
reviewable under Perry. Thumm, 153 Idaho at 542, 285 P.3d at 357. On appeal in
the post-conviction case, the Court held that I.C. § 19-4901(b) barred those claims in
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the absence of evidence that they could not have been presented earlier in the
exercise of due diligence. Thumm, No. 45290, 2019 WL 848061, at *16.
Thumm is consistent with precedent interpreting I.C. § 19-4901(b) to require
a petitioner to chose his forum — direct appeal or post-conviction relief — for claims
that could benefit from factual development. Kraft, 100 Idaho at 674, 603 P.2d at
1008; see also Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549, 989 P.2d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 1999) (if an
appellate court were to reach the merits of the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim on direct appeal, the absence of any factual record would generally require an
adverse decision to the appellant, which would become res judicata).
When a defendant choses to litigate fundamental error on appeal — even
when certain to fail without factual support — I.C. § 19-4901(b) bars re-litigation of
the error in post-conviction relief. However, I.C. § 19-4901(b) does not require
defendants to doom such claims on direct appeal and, instead, allows them to
reserve the issue for post-conviction relief.
5.

I.C. § 19-4901’s plainly provides a remedy for prejudicial
fundamental errors that deprive a defendant of his right to a
fair trial even where that error did not occur as a result of
ineffective assistance of counsel

Post-conviction relief is available to claim that the defendant’s conviction or
sentence violates “the constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of
this state.” I.C. § 19-4901(1)(a). According to the state, the legislature actually
intended to provide relief for prejudicial constitutional violations only when they
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occur as a result of counsel’s ineffective assistance, were revealed by changing
precedent or supported by newly discovered facts.
The state claims such a construction is necessary to protect the courts from
sandbagging by indigent defendants represented by overworked public defenders
who (apparently) intentionally sit on fundamental errors so they can be raised in
post-conviction relief. Of larger concern: “Practitioners of criminal law must find it
disquieting to be told that only the discretionary largesse of an appellate court
stands between them and the bar of res judicata. State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516,
524, 708 P.2d 921, 929 (Ct. App. 1985) (J. Burnett, concurring).
The attorney representing a defendant whose trial attorney missed a
constitutional error resulting in an unconstitutional conviction is left with two
entirely ineffectual remedies: raise the non “clear or obvious” fundamental error on
appeal and have the claim foreclosed by res judicata in post-conviction relief or, (2)
“forfeit” the issue by not raising the issue on direct appeal. This “gotcha”
interpretation of the statute is not supported by its plain language or intent.
The central purpose of any system of criminal justice is to convict the guilty
and free the innocent. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975). Before we
continue to tightened procedural bars that close the judiciary’s doors for the
accused, it is important to remember finality doesn’t not always equate justice. That
Chris Tapp could not navigate post-conviction relief procedures sufficient to survive
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summary dismissal during his many knocks at the court’s door did not make his
confession less false or the victim’s murderer less free. See Tapp v. State, No. 43347,
2017 WL 993188, at *4 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2017); Tapp v. State, No. 40197,
2013 WL 6171026, at *12 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2013); see also https://
www.idahostatesman.com/news/local/crime/article230476419.html#storylink=cpy)
(Brian Dripp confessed and charged with murder after his DNA matched that of the
semen tested after the crime and other articles tested years later); https://
www.idahostatesman.com/news/local/crime/article230630919.html (none of Tapp’s
DNA found on crime scene evidence and “FBI investigators, a polygraph expert,
DNA experts, false-confession experts and victim’s own mother concluded Tapp
falsely confessed under coercion).
Ineffective assistance of counsel is highly deferential and the attorney for a
defendant deprived of his right to fair trial might not have been so objectively
unreasonable (without the aid of hindsight) to have provided ineffective assistance
of counsel. The post-conviction relief act provides a remedy for such defendants.
C.

Mr. Bower Established that he Received Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Violation of the Sixth Amendment by a Preponderance
of the Evidence
The district court found Mr. Bower was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s

failure to argue that the charges were improperly joined under I.C.R. 8 because the
state established a prima facie showing of a common scheme and plan. The state
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asks this Court to affirm the district court, in part, because the Court of Appeals
concluded that the state made “at least a primafacie showing that the evidence of
Bower's conduct alleged would have been admissible in both trials. The state argues
that the Court of Appeals thus already determined that a motion to sever the
charges pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a) would have been unsuccessful and the matter is now
res judicata.
As noted by the state, issue preclusion protects litigants from re-litigating an
identical issue with the same party or its privy.” The question on direct appeal was
whether the issue of Rule 8 joinder was preserved on appeal by the Rule 14 motion.
State v. Bower, No. 41336, 2015 WL 654467, at *4 (Idaho Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2015).
The Court’s comment that the state made a prima facie showing of a common
scheme did not address the issue of whether a properly argued and preserved Rule 8
motion should have been granted.
For all the reasons argued in Mr. Bower’s opening brief, he established that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel and the district court erred in
dismissing Mr. Bower’s post-conviction relief petition.
III. CONCLUSION
As argued above and in Mr. Bower’s opening brief, he established that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment and
that the state violated his right to due process as protected by the Fourteenth
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Amendment. This Court should reverse the district court’s judgment denying Mr.
Bower’s petition and remand with instruction to grant his requested relief.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of May 2019.

FYFFE LAW, LLC

/s/ Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
Attorney for Kyle Bower
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